Mark Facchini

Northeastern Illinois University

Department of Criminal Justice and Sociology

5500 N. St. Louis Ave.

Chicago IL, 60625-4699

Many times in law the translation from a subject's reality to legal discourse can leave certain points (emotions, realities, future implications, etc.) and voices unexpressed. The "regnant forms of law" (Milovanovic, 1996, p.295) by which is meant traditional legal practices, fail to completely express the entire reality that a victim or offender may encounter. Therefore, the victim/offender is not allowed full expression of him/herself in law and legal discourse. This lack of full expression creates an unavoidable inequality in law, and places the subject in law at the full mercy of the attorney. The victim/offender is not empowered by law, but rather disempowered and forced to reside within a legal language that denies them full expression, and forces them to subside under legal definitions that label people victim, offender, witness etc. Cinematic representations of crime also construct people/characters in a singular and narrow way. Alternative identification for a viewing subject with a character/speaking subject is minimal (Silverman, 1983 p. 204). We see the cinematic representations of crime as shortsighted at best. In this article I will use the work of psychoanalyst Jacque Lacan and his four discourses to model and discuss the lack of expression in law between an attorney and her client. Second, I will explain how this repressive form of law is first embodied in law school. Third, I will apply Lacan’s Four discourses to cinematic representations of crime. This application will ideally allow us to see the influence of cinema crime upon its viewers.

The discourse used in law is unfamiliar to the victim/offender (subject in law). The victim/offender is forced, by a lack of alternative discourses in law, to quickly identify with a new dis-empowering legal discourse. The victim/offender is given no other option but to identify, embody, and understand the new legal discourse. There is usually little or no explanation of the new discourse to the victim/offender by their attorney. Any explanation given to a client is myopic at best, and runs the chance of becoming dogma. Having little knowledge of the new discourse, the victim/offender is only able to achieve/allocate little expression and comprehension. Often a victim/offender can feel left out, or pas toute, from her own legal process. The subject in law may feel that her legal process has become that of the attorney, and not of her own. This feeling of being left out can create gaps in being within the victim/offender. A desire to understand is blocked by a lack of involvement in the legal process. These gaps will eventually seek closure. The victim/offender voice is denied expression due to lack of knowledge and participation in the legal language/process and lack of options for expression in legal language.

Legal terms offer little expression for a subject in law. Legal definitions are very narrow and offer little room for alternate interpretations. The terms "assault" and "armed robbery" are incapable of fully expressing the fear, pain, and humiliation a victim may feel. Legal terms/definitions also allow little expression for a violator of a law to explain the rush, foreground and post-modern pressures (Katz, 1988). The insanity defense separates a defendant from his/her chance to possibly explain years of physical and mental abuse that would otherwise justify severe action (Bannister and Milovanovic, 1990). The insanity defense does not empower the victim/offender/subject in law, but rather dis-empowers them and labels their action irrational and not socially justifiable. The insanity defense gives justification based on mental instability as opposed to a rational self-defense justification. Similarly, the charge of shoplifting gives no expression to a man/woman who has to steal food to feed his/her family, or explain the intense foreground rush of doing something wrong (Katz, 1988, p. 66). Legal language lacks the ability to express and give consideration to independent variables that may cause a subject to violate laws.

The denial of voices in law is a deeply rooted practice originating in legal education (Arrigo, forthcoming). To fully understand the denial of voices in law we should consider the works of several scholars: Bruce Arrigo's (1998) critique of discourse training in law school; the various works by Dragan Milovanovic and Stewart Henry who both build on Jacques Lacan's notion of psychoanalytical semiotics; Freire’s (1985) work on dialogical pedagogy; and Lopez’s (1992) application of Freire to rebellious lawyering. Let us look particularly at Lacan’s notion of the four discourses. These discourses are used to explain the development and movement of a discourse between a sender and a receiver. The four discourses show/model the interplay between the subject and the language in use, as well as the body of knowledge embedded within the discourse in use (Milovanovic, 1994a, p.177). All four of the discourses are set up in the same pattern: agent/truth ® other/production. The positions stay the same, but what resides within them changes. The agent/truth is the sender/enactor of the message. The other/production is the recipient of the message. There are four symbols or matheems ($, a, S1, S2 ) that reside within and move along each of the four positions. S1 stands for master signifiers, which are ideas and beliefs learned early in childhood development and are further reinforced by the social environment as one grows older (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996, pp.30, 206). S2 stands for any kind of knowledge that is embedded within the discourse in use. This could be understood as a certain knowledge of experience needed to understand jargon or technical terminology. $ stands for what is called the fading, desiring subject and the speaking being. The letter/symbol a stands for what is pas toute, left out, unsaid, what is not fully expressed and left incomplete. What is to the left or above the bar, /, is more overt, visible, and conscious. What is to the right or below the bar, /, is more hidden, and unconscious. (Milovanovic, 1994a, pp.176-180)

All of the four discourses have possible applications to law and legal education, but the two that apply best to law school are the discourse of the master and the discourse of the hysteric. The discourse of the master sets up as follows: S1/$ ® S2/a. The master signifier (S1) sends a message to the other, which in turn creates a body of knowledge (S2) in the Other. This body of knowledge still makes the other feel incomplete; it may contradict with her belief system. The receiver does not quite understand and thus feels uneasy; she is not all (a). The incomplete feeling ($) felt by the other helps to reinforce the sender’s truth and intensifies the recipients need for this body of knowledge (S1). The discourse of the master sets up the same way in law school (Arrigo, forthcoming). Law school students are forced to learn and identify with new words such as "due process", "intent", "probable cause", and "assault and battery" (S1). The student attempts to embody these new words along with their ideological content and specialized meanings that represent a certain type of legal knowledge (S2) (Arrigo, forthcoming). The student literally has to do a mental paradigm shift to accommodate strict legal definitions of words. The student has to switch to a juridical linguistic coordinate system (Milovanovic, 1994b, pp.232-233). From this new linguistic system, some knowledge will be inconsistent and contradictory with the student's pre-existing belief system. This is further intensified with the use of case law where both parties have reasonable claims. The information sent by the professor to the student which includes facts, sequencing of facts, and the domain (juridic linguistic coordinate system) for which they are to be used creates the body of knowledge. The information not included within this body of knowledge, such as alternative reading of facts, different sequencing, different domains, are attempting to seek expression in law, but are denied (a). The denial of expression of alternative interpretations further legitimates the law-professor's body of knowledge ($) (Arrigo, forthcoming).

The discourse of the hysteric sets up as follows: $/a ® S1/S2 (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996, p. 206). The hysteric is not just meant in the traditional clinical sense, but rather it can be anyone opposing the dominant order. The hysteric is a split person, she is not "all" ($). The hysteric seeks understanding and justification for her situation. The hysteric is only offered stereotypes and labels to explain her present condition (S1). These terms, stereotypes, and labels, do not allow the hysteric any expression and understanding of her situation; the hysteric is given no explanation for her condition, she feels left out, unchanged, and is just left with this clinical body of knowledge with which to identify (S2). This information, which makes the hysteric feel incomplete and not "all", is caused by the reproduction of the dominant body of knowledge that makes the hysteric feel uneasy (a).

The discourse of the hysteric demonstrates the interplay between law student and the legal speak/discourse (Arrigo, forthcoming). The divided or split subject is the law school student ($). The student wants to embody the new legal discourse and achieve expression using the dominant language of law (S1). In order for the student to do this, she must fully invoke the new body of knowledge (S2). As a result, the student does not find full expression because the new body of knowledge is not consistent with her own belief system. This causes the student to feel left out, not all; her personal discourse and belief system is not completely consistent with the good legal discourse and its master signifiers (a) (Arrigo, forthcoming).

Law school students often find themselves in the same bewildered condition occupied by their future clients. When a lay person, uninformed as to the regnant forms of law (by which is meant traditional law practice), enters a lawyers office they can easily be set into the position of the hysteric. The client may have been a victim, or facing the most challenging time in her life; she may find herself at the mercy of her lawyer. If the attorney is a public defender, the client may feel unimportant, as if she is nothing more than another case-file. If the attorney is private, the person could be conscious of how much money the situation is costing, and if she asked any questions, it could cost money and be detrimental to her case. In both situations a client can feel generally overwhelmed with the entire situation. All of these subtle situations could very easily make the client feel uneasy ($). When the client explains the case to her counsel, the story may be absent of the entire situation. The client may have difficulty in explaining the reality of the situation to her counsel. It is nearly impossible for a client to explain everything to her lawyer. The client may also use a discourse of the street to explain her case. The different discourse and holes within the story create a sense of confusion for the attorney because she has to then translate the story into the legal discourse (S1). In return, the attorney offers only legal definitions of the client's case. Additionally, the client may be labeled "victim", "perpetrator", "assailant", etc. (S2). These definitions further enlarge the holes in the client's case, as well as leave what could possibly be very serious information unexpressed. The client has not been given full expression in law; the client feels incomplete. The client must try to understand and attempt to reproduce the dominant legal discourse in her story, which makes her feel uneasy (a).

Within prison, so-called "jailhouse lawyers" attempt to remedy the position of the hysteric in law. These jailhouse lawyers are inmates familiar with the law and who generally work in the prison law library. They specialize in helping inmates in mostly three areas: bail reduction, dismissal of a case or reduction in sentence, and suppression hearings (Milovanovic, 1997,p. 102). These inmates, for a nominal fee (cigarettes, extra food), will help an inmate prepare and file certain motions when an inmate's attorney is not readily available. The jailhouse lawyer's greatest power in unseating an inmate's position of the hysteric is the ability to better translate "inmate" discourse into "legal" discourse. This improved translation of the inmate's situation, as well as the jailhouse lawyer’s ability to explain things to the inmate, leaves the inmate feeling more complete.

Activist and rebellious lawyers have also helped to unseat the client as the hysteric. Activist lawyers attempt to use politicized discourse to elucidate alienation and mistreatment of their client (Bannister and Milovanovic, pp. 179-198 1990.). Most likely, such discourse is objected to and a necessity defense is left to rely upon. Within legal language, the activist lawyer is not allowed to politicize or philosophize the particular case. Her legal points may be valid, but she is not allowed to express them within legal language. This forces the attorney to "clean" the case politically, preventing her from making a particular point. The activist lawyer is forced to find expression within a limited legal language, or find justification within the necessity defense. A necessity defense may not empower a client, but it could influence the court sufficiently to side with the client. A lawyer must show, using the necessity defense, that her client acted in a certain way to avoid a greater imminent danger. This allows for somewhat of a politicized version to appear.

Rebellious lawyers, as shown by Lopez using Freire’s work (Lopez, 1992), and activist lawyers want to create an alternative discourse that better shows the biases and unfairness that are present in law and legal discourse by better informing and explaining the law to their client. They see law and legal discourse as favoring some voices while denying others. Law tends to see one reality, where in actuality many may exist. The rebellious lawyer’s new legal discourse will not be something that is carved in stone and unchanging. Rather, it will be dissipative and sensitive to its environment and able to change. This new legal discourse is derived from a notion of replacement discourses: replacement discourses give us the ability to stabilize alternative discourses, and inject them within the dominant discourse (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996,p.204). A legal discourse such as this will be better able to express the multiple needs of a diverse community. Gaps in expression from story to story should be significantly smaller. In cases such as this, the goal is twofold. First, the attorney is better able to understand and identify with the discourse of her client. This enhanced understanding will in turn produce a clearer translation into the new more dissipative replacement discourse in law. Second, the attorney will be able to translate the client's case into this dissipative discourse that allows for much more expression. This new discourse will make the case more understanding for the client.

Unseating the master and hysteric in law and in legal education can be accomplished by combining the discourse of the hysteric and the analyst (Arrigo, forthcoming). Paulo Freire’s study of literacy in South America indicates that working with people on a concrete level is better than simply forcing something on them. In a sense, working with people and with what they have to offer assists in shaping new language or master signifiers. We do not simply want to create an entirely new discourse, but rather to build on the existing one. Replacing an entire discourse without any regard to an old one would be very similar to enacting a master discourse.

The discourse of the analyst is as follows a/S2 ® $/S1. What happens here is the analyst (sender/attorney) sees the client and mirrors her (a), or demonstrates to the client what she believes is not being verbalized. During this reflection, the client sees herself for who she really is ($). As the client sees herself, she is forced to deal with her own belief system and master signifiers (S1). After recognizing her master signifiers, she separates herself from the old signifiers and creates new ones (S1`). This creation of new master signifiers in turn shows the analyst (attorney) a new body of knowledge (S2).

As for a new law school student, she is part of a group that is not achieving full expression due to her lack of knowledge of the legal language (Arrigo, forthcoming). The law school student is the "hysteric." The law professor is equivalent to Freire’s cultural revolutionary teaching literacy (Arrigo, forthcoming), the professor is the analyst. The law professor is feeling left out (a) because of the body of knowledge (S2) she has received from her students. This feeling of being "left out" reflects upon the law students, who then see themselves as divided and not completely understanding the language ($). This uneasy feeling causes the student/hysteric to reexamine certain words and master signifiers (S1). During this reexamination, the professor/analyst is able to help the student/hysteric understand the importance of certain words and embrace new master signifiers, even if it is only temporary (S1`). The opportunity for the professor to reexamine master signifiers with the student can create a discourse that better embodies the desire of the student. In the same way, the opportunity for the analyst and the hysteric to reexamine master signifiers creates new master signifiers (S1`).

According to Arrigo, analyst/hysteric relationships can greatly help improve law school situations. He calls for the deconstruction and reconstruction of syllogistic and deductive reasoning in law to be incorporated into the entire law school educational process. He also calls for more master signifiers to better embody the desire of a large diverse number of people, which would in turn privilege local knowledge (i.e., students, clients) when it comes to the study of case law. Arrigo sees the student teacher relationship as an on-going process.

The analyst/hysteric application to lawyer-client relationships is quite similar. The lawyer is the sender and the client is the receiver. After initial meetings, the lawyer may begin to construct the client's case in legal speak. The client may become visibly uncomfortable or interject statements such as "There is more to the story than that", "You forgot this point", or "You just don’t understand." The rebellious lawyer, acting as the analyst, will recognize the client's anxiety and thus create a body of knowledge to accompany with it (S2). This knowledge will in turn allow the lawyer to reflect this uncomfortable feeling back to the client (a). The client believes herself to be incomplete and unable to personally express herself in law ($). This causes the client to look at the master signifiers and to separate herself from them because they are denying her full expression. Together, the lawyer and client develop a new set of master signifiers (S1`) that better express the client's feelings and case. The development of new master signifiers allows the lawyer to develop a body of knowledge that is capable of expressing his client's case within legal discourse.

The use of the discourse of the analyst and the hysteric is very important to show the possible development of replacement discourses in law and legal education. The client and lawyer together can develop a legal language that is more in tune with what chaos theorists call dissipative and expressive forms of law. This new legal discourse would be a language of the client, meaning a replacement discourse, and not a language given to the client. The expression of one story in street discourse would loose little meaning in this new discourse. Clients would feel much more capable of expression without politicizing their case, as in the necessity defense.

The need for a more expressive form of law is compelling. People are left unexpressed in law and forced to operate within a language that recognizes one logic and one reality only. Legal discourse pays little attention to the post-modern pressures of today’s world. Legal discourse needs to change along with changing society in order for it to properly serve the people. Here, I have suggested a possibility of discourse transformation by presenting Lacan’s four discourses, Henry and Milovanovic’s replacement discourses, and Arrigo’s notion of law school reform.

A link should be established between the legal profession and the cinema. In film making, shot relationships (i.e. shot sequence, editing, negation, etc.) are equivalent to syntactic relationships in law (Silverman, 1983,p.201). Both relationships establish meaning. Both relationships establish subjects, viewing and juridic respectively. A shot-reverse/shot formation in cinema is a common film technique that is equivalent to the imaginary space created by lawyers in their presentation to the jury (Silverman, 1983, p.201; Milovanovic, 1994b, p.244). A shot-reverse/shot formation is a camera maneuver where the second shot of the camera shows the field/viewer/spectator from which the first shot was taken (Silverman, 1983, p. 202). The first shot is considered imaginary and can show the limitations of the camera (Silverman, 1983, p. 203). This limitation, in a sense, establishes a cinematic gap in being, a desire in the viewing subject to see the source of the field/view. This imaginary space that establishes a gap allows the viewing subject (the person sitting in the theater) to make his/her own constructions of who or what is the spectator. The viewing subject's construction is somewhat incomplete, and this may cause the viewer to feel uneasy (Silverman, 1983, p. 204); this uneasy feeling, this gap in being, thus creates a desire (in the viewing subject) to see more. The second shot unveils the viewer/spectator. However, all is still not visible; the camera has its limitations. The viewing subject becomes more dependent upon the camera to help close this gap in being, to suture over, to see what is unseen to the viewer (Silverman, 1983, pp. 204-205; Henry and Milovanovic, 1996, p. 199).

The imaginary space created by lawyers during a trial allows jurors to create their own constructions of what happened (Milovanovic, 1994b, p.245). It is essential that the lawyer give jurors a certain "domain" in which to construct their own ideas. The lawyer gives the set-up, equivalent to the first shot of the shot-reverse/shot formation. In turn, each juror frames the situation as best they can within the specified domain. This is equivalent to the viewing subject's field or construction. A juror may begin to question the situation constructed by the lawyer: the juror desires more information but is denied and she begins to experience gaps in being. The domain created by the lawyer lies within a juridic ideology employed to create the desired goal (Milovanovic, 1994b, p.232). The desired goal may contradict with the jurors own belief system, as well as with that of the victim/offender. A juror may feel that they do not arrive at the same conclusion as the lawyer, similar as is the viewing subject does not expect the second shot of the shot-reverse/shot formation to unveil a certain spectator/view. This contradiction equally creates gaps in being for the victim/offender as well as for the juror and viewing subject. While the victim/offender and juror attempt to close these gaps in being with suture, these gaps are equivalent to those gaps of a viewing subject created by a second shot that reveals an unexpected or contradictory point. The victim/offender relationship with counsel creates similar gaps with similar contradictions, or secondary gaps.

The imaginary space (or shot) created by lawyers is also intended to establish the victim/offender as a subject in law. The subject can be created with gaps in being that need suture. The victim/offender (subject, viewing subject) attempts to close these gaps. This attempted closure is the same as the viewing subjects attempt to close gaps between shot 1 and shot 2. The victim/offender subject and the viewing subject are identical in their process of suture.

The shot-reverse/shot formation finds its locus in the technology of the cinema (Silverman, 1983, p. 204). The victim/offender, on the other hand, find a locus in the attorney. Many times, the single locus, following a dominant logic of cinema and law, reinforces and causes greater gaps in being. Both the viewing subject and victim/offender/juror are aware that there is truth and undiscovered knowledge beyond the camera (Silverman, 1983, p. 204) and legal language.

The viewing subject and victim/offender are additionally related outside of their similar process of suture. The viewing subject is subjected to a limited amount of information, and yet still demands more information. The viewing subject has a desire to see what the cinematic characters are seeing. The victim/offender is subjected to a translation of reality within the juridic linguistic coordinate system (LCS) (Milovanovic, 1994b, pp. 232-233). The LCS is a bounded sphere of possible meanings for different words and ideas. The victim/offender desires a greater understanding and a more complete being within legal discourse. The viewing subject and victim/offender are both forced to reside within a dominant domain that denies them full expression and being -- the juridic LCS and the technology of cinema. When the viewing subject and victim/offender attempt to achieve full expression, they are bombarded with gaps in being and contradictions.

The speaking subject in cinema (character, camera, etc.) and the lawyer both serve to regulate what the viewing subject and victim/offender embody. The speaking subject is the gaze or look belonging to a fictional character in cinema (Silverman, 1983, p.202). The speaking subject is the one who the viewing subject attempts to identify with. Full identification of the viewing subject with the speaking subject is the goal of cinematic suture. The viewing subject wants to be able to fully identify with the speaking subject. Complete and full identification is however uncommon.

The lawyer is the translator and enactor of legal discourse for the victim/offender and juror. The victim/offender interacts with the lawyer to create a situation completely within the dominant legal discourse. The goal of this production is translation and identification of the victim/offender’s story from reality to legalese. The victim/offender wants to be able to fully identify with the translated reality, but she is unable to because of all the gaps and contradictions. Complete identification here is also very uncommon, outside of activist and rebellious lawyering (Lopez, 1992; Bannister and Milovanovic, 1990).

Suture is the primary attempt to close gaps in being. Suture is the procedure when subjectivity is given to the viewing subject (Silverman, 1983, p.195). Subjectivity is given to the viewer through cinematic text, which includes shot relationships, negation, and editing. The gaps are created when the viewing subject lacks a full understanding of the speaking subject. Suture attempts to close these gaps through connection/identification of the speaking subject to the viewing subject. Such identification is accomplished by allowing the cinematic character to be seen as a person who the viewing subject could easily be. Suture is complete when the viewing subject sees herself as the speaking subject, as a character able to understand why and how she did what she did (Silverman, 1983, p.205).

Suture in law follows similar lines. The victim/offender attempts to identify with a certain idea or desire. The victim/offender applies the idea or desire in an appropriate way according to the legal domain (Milovanovic, 1994a, p. 159-160). The victim/offender attempts to put herself inside the legal discourse and identify with the discourse as need be. In a way, the victim/offender disappears within the legal discourse under the terms of I, victim, witness, perpetrator, etc. (Milovanovic, 1994a, p. 160). This suture or closing of the gap in law is complete when the victim/offender sees herself fully embodied within the legal discourse, achieving full expression and representation. Full embodiment is very unlikely, due to contradictions and gaps in stories, therefore creating greater or secondary gaps in being. Closure of secondary gaps is attempted through replacement discourse, activist lawyering, and rebellious lawyering.

These gaps in cinema can be modeled similarly to gaps in law by using Lacan’s four discourses. In cinematic, as well as media representations of crime, the outcome upon the viewers can be profound. In a time when the media (i.e. cinema, news, video games, etc.) is being called upon to take responsibility for influencing violence in society, it is important to analyze the effects of the media upon subjects. The particular effect I am interested in is the effect of cinematic and media representations of crime. Lacan’s four discourses are ideal for this application because it (in)directly models the effect of a message upon the recipient.

Lacan’s four discourses follow the same pattern I discussed earlier. The key point of interest here is what appears in the lower right hand corner of the discourse typology -- the production and the effects in the unconscious (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996, p.30). This is key because production in the unconscious is what could have a long-term influence upon the subject. The effects in the unconscious can also show the possible development of secondary gaps in being due to the lack of full identification. A subject's gap-in-being might explain why a subject may act out (criminal/violent) in order to attempt to close this gap. The unconscious effect could also help to explain the lack of direct connection between cinematic and media representations of crime and the criminal acts of subjects. Sacco (1998) attempts to develop a more direct connection between peoples " private troubles" and the "social issue of crime." While Sacco sees the media as a direct interplay between the two (Sacco, 1998,p.37), I would argue that the connection is more indirect and covert.

The first discourse, the discourse of the master, sets up as follows S1/$ ® S2/a (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996, p. 31). Here again, the master sends a message to the receiver containing master signifiers (S1). The receiver in turn attempts to embody these master signifiers and develop them into a body of knowledge (S2). This new body of knowledge is not consistent with the receiver's current belief system, so she feels incomplete and left out, as if she does not quite understand something (a). The production (effects on the unconscious) are that of confusion and incompleteness. The receiver is now lacking something; they are not all -- they are pas toute (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996, p. 32). For a viewing subject, this could be seen as a lack of understanding or explanation by a speaking subject. (a) could be understood as a conclusion to a film that leaves the viewing subject confused, or it could be likewise seen as a cliff hanger-ending that resolves nothing for the viewing subject. For example, the constant rebirths of "Jason" from Friday the 13^th films follow similar suit. Such a film as this that contains contradictions and lacks closure is bound to leave viewing subjects confused and upset. The lack of consideration for future implications can leave a viewing subject grasping for something to identify with. A gap has now been created and it is up to the viewing subject to attempt to close it. The viewing subject may attempt to come up with imaginary conclusions that close the gaps, but these most likely will lead only to secondary gaps in being. Most likely, the viewer will disregard the conclusion and allow it to settle, although the idea has been firmly planted within the viewing subjects unconscious. This is were the long-term effects begin to brew. A film's lack of consideration for future implication(s), as well as its violent composition/nature begins to produce a mental back drop or reference point for future justification of violent behavior within the viewing subject.

A similar situation develops in the news media when viewing subjects hear about certain stories of crime or violence. Here, when the viewing subject is exposed to a particular news story (S1), she attempts to understand it and identify with it (S2). Possibly after repeated attempts, the viewing subject feels that she cannot quite understand the rationalization behind the crime or violence (a). The subject may attempt to disregard the story, or attempt justification based on different grounds, but the bottom line is that the criminal or violent act has been introduced through what could be considered a fairly authoritative source.

The second discourse, the discourse of the university (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996, p. 31-32) sets up one quarter turn counter clockwise from the discourse of the master. The set up is as follows; S2/S1 ® a/$. Here, a body of knowledge (S2) is sent to the receiver, but she is having trouble understanding it, which in turn makes her feel left out (a). This lack of understanding can make the receiver feel divided ($) and, in turn, keep her from speaking up regarding the confusion. The sender does not know that the receiver does not understand. This, in return, reinforces the master signifiers or belief system (S1) of the sender, producing additional bodies of knowledge. The production effects upon the receiver's unconsciousness is that of division or the product of confusion, such as when then there may be peer pressure not to express or admit confusion. This division exists for the viewing subject when there are multiple endings in cinema and the media (S2). When one point in the film makes sense, but others do not, the viewing subject could feel left out (a). The divided viewing subject ($) allows the speaking subject to further identify with a belief system (S1) and produce more unclear bodies of knowledge. This use of dogma over an unsure viewing subject is most commonly seen in such shows as Macgyver, where the character has a remarkable unbelievable ability to create devices out of everyday items. This knowledge of the speaking subject baffles the viewer, and forces them to further believe that the character is that much more knowledgeable.

In the news media, this could be most common with reports that involve technical knowledge. The reporters have only moments to explain these ideas, and may have little knowledge of these ideas. This lack of understanding, as well as the short time allowed for a story to be told places severe constraints on how stories are described and understood (Sacco, 1998, p.41). Such reports are an example of the discourse of the university: The reporter presents a complex story to the viewing subject in an extremely short period of time (S2); the viewing subject tries to catch all the information and understand it, but she is unable to (a); the lack of understanding and ability for the viewing subject to question the reporter ($) simply reinforces the reporter's story and belief system. It is as if the media's lack of full explanation is justified by the dogma-like ingestion of stories by the viewing subject (S1). Sacco suggests that the media pick and choose the truly important stories, and give them more time and explanation to avoid constraints on explanation, and the inevitable viewer confusion.

What is important here in both the media and cinema is the lack of complete explanation to the viewing subject, and in turn the viewing subject's inability to object to her confusion. The division of the viewing subject allows ignorance and understanding to coexist within the same subject, on the same general topic. It is possible that at any one moment one part could over compensate for the other and cause the subject to operate in situations she is not qualified to. This division could also cause the subject to experience unfounded conclusions based on premises that she is unsure of. What is needed to avoid this confusion is greater explanation of technical areas and less assumptions about the viewing subject's knowledge.

The third discourse, the discourse of the hysteric (Milovanovic, 1994a, p. 178-179), sets up on a quarter turn clockwise from the discourse of the master. The set up is as follows: $/a ® S1/S2. Here, the hysteric explains the problem to the receiver ($). The receiver, in an attempt to understand the problems of the hysteric (which is not just meant in its clinical sense, but is anyone experiencing confusion) responds with clinical stereotypes and general terms of explanation (S1). This new body of knowledge given to the hysteric allows for little explanation or embodiment (S2). The hysteric is left with no choice but to reproduce this body of knowledge in an attempt to understand herself. This self-induced forced explanation does nothing but make the hysteric feel more uncomfortable and confused (a). This happens in the cinema when a viewing subject is given only cinematic master signifiers to identify with (S1). This lack of options for identification in turn produces a body of knowledge, but a knowledge which is that of the speaking subject (S2) and not of the viewing subject. This foreign body of knowledge makes the viewing subject feel uneasy because she has no choice but to reproduce that body of knowledge. A result such as this is common among movies that stereotype a certain group. The uneasy feeling arises when the viewing subject does not agree with the stereotype. The uneasiness is increased when the viewing subject is technically part of the stereotyped group, but who does not see herself as being part of such a stereotype. This body of knowledge produced by the cinema approaches that of the dogma produced by the discourse of the university.

In an application to the media, we can see the discourse of the hysteric as an attempted clarification by a confused viewing subject. The viewing subject could present a question to the media in form of a letter, or a letter to the editor, etc. ($). When the response comes, if it comes at all, it is written within the same paradigm the story was told. There is no attempt to explain the story from the ground up, but rather just a more complete reiteration of the initial news story (S1). The viewing subject now attempts to understand the "new" explanation and the "new" body of knowledge on which it is based (S2). The viewing subject is left with no choice but to try to reproduce the dominant body of knowledge to understand the story. The identification holds no ground and nothing is explained, in fact the viewer is left more confused, and even farther out of the picture (a).

The fourth discourse, the discourse of the analyst (Milovanovic, 1994a, pp. 179-180), is one-quarter turn clockwise from the discourse of the hysteric. The set up is as follows: a/S2 ® $/S1. The analyst is the sender, and the patient is the receiver. The analyst views the patient, and presents back to the patient what she sees (a). The client sees herself for the first time as she is perceived by others ($). The patient does not like what she sees, and attempt to develop a new master signifier (S1`) and release her old master signifiers. If new identification is complete, the patient will have a new set of master signifiers and discard the old ones (S1`). Once the patient has been alienated from her old master signifiers, and has identified with new master signifiers, the analyst is able to gain a body of knowledge from this (S2). This is interesting because we see a (positive) change in not only the receiver, but the sender as well. This can be applied in cinema with films that show change in the speaking subject, or that show change in the viewing subject. First, change within the speaking subject can be seen on screen when one character (patient) comes up with what they believe to be a brilliant idea. The second subject (analyst) reviews the idea, and presents it back to the first subject, emphasizing possible errors (a). The first subject quickly comes to terms with the problems within the idea, and feels uncomfortable with it ($). In turn, the first subject has to reject the old ideas and the master signifiers (S1) and develop new ones (S1`). The change within the first subject then creates a body of knowledge for the second subject (S2). Change within the viewing subject happens similarly, with the speaking subject as the analyst, and the viewing subject as the patient. Usually, the viewing subject identifies with a character in the film, and comes to recognize that character's errors. The message sent in the film, through a character's error, personality, etc., is seen by the viewing subject (a). The viewing subject sees a little bit of herself in this character and, for the first time, sees how she too may have erroneous ideas ($). This cinematic message distances the viewing subject's new ideas/master signifiers (S1`) from her old ideas (S1). The film, because it is inanimate, gains no body of knowledge, but it is possible that creators of the film discover the changes and are able to develop a new body of knowledge with it (S2).

In the media, similar situations occur. A good example is that of a person who is racist. This person may base her beliefs on certain weak points that she sees valid. The person is the patient, or the viewing subject. When she observes a media report which includes an interview with a racist person with extreme views or actions (a) [shown to perhaps magnify the character's ideological error], she does not agree with it, and sees the report as wrong. The moderately racist person however may have trouble identifying with the extremist ($): she (viewing subject/patient) may begin to feel alienated from her racist ideas and master signifiers. She begins to separate herself from her old ideas because she recognizes them as wrong (S1) and develops new ideas or master signifiers (S1’). Again, the media, as an inanimate object can develop no body of knowledge, but rather a reporter, etc. may hear of the change and develop of body of knowledge accordingly (S2). The problem here is that the change can be forced upon, and not applied equally to, the viewing subject. Forced re-identification is just as bad as dogma. It benefits no one and can encourage change through ignorance.

An interesting tool of change that can be used by law and legal education, as well as the cinema and the media is Paulo Freire’s development of dialogical pedagogy. This is essentially change and education through cooperation (Milovanovic, 1994a, p.182). Dialogical pedagogy develops change through application at the subject's own level. This is not a dominant ordered change, but rather a developed interaction between two people. We can further this idea by combining the discourse of the hysteric and the analyst to develop replacement discourse for change (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996). The new master signifiers developed here would be more "of the people" and open to even further change. More then one voice would induce the change, and therefore more then one voice could exist within the new master signifiers (S1`). We need moveable S1` produced through change because the more stationary the S1, the greater the chance we run of it developing into forced identification or dogma; the greater the opportunity for gaps to develop (Milovanovic, 1994a. p. 182).

Lacan’s four discourses have allowed us to model four types of speaking subject-induced changes upon the viewing subject. These changes are key because they develop in the unconsciousness of the subject. These changes can have long term effect, both positive and negative. It is key to encourage the positive change and to redevelop the areas of negative change. It is also equally important to make certain that change is induced parallel to the subject, and not from above, due to risk of forced identification and dogma. The cinema and media need to begin to take responsibility for the messages they communicate and the change, or lack there of, that they produce. The lack of responsibility in the media, and mostly cinema, in their portrayal of violence and crime must be examined in order to fully understand the effects of cinematic and media representations of crime and violence upon the viewing subjects. Application of Lacan’s four discourses assists in explaining cinematic and media effects on the voices of subjects.