ON THE POSSIBILITY OF
SYNTHESIS IN STRATIFICATION THEORY: A STUDY IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT RED FEATHER INSTITUTE
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ARCHIVES
of the TRANSFORMING SOCIOLOGY SERIES of the RED FEATHER INSTITUTE for ADVANCED STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY
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ON THE
POSSIBILITY OF SYNTHESIS IN STRATIFICATION THEORY:
A STUDY IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
ABSTRACT
A nationally broad-based and thematically unified movement toward synthesis in stratification theory came into being in the period 1959-1966. Although tactically diverse and often operating independently of one another, these works exhibit a common strategy of identifying a conceptual antinomy between marxian/conflict and Weberian-Durkheimian/functional theory which they attempt to transcend. If the formal criterion of the emergent novelty of synthetic products is applied, these otherwise meta-theoretically fruitful attempts do not succeed. By defining the two models as partial and complementary, the proposed synthesis is obviated ab initio. It is argued that this failure is not the result of "error," but rather flows from the nature and function of social theory itself. |
INTRODUCTION The desire to combine competing
interpretations of social reality into a cohesive whole remains an enticing goal within
sociology in general (cf. Gouldner, 1971; and Friedrichs, 1970) as well as within the more
circumscribed purview of students of social stratification. This last tendency is
manifested most clearly and vigorously in the works of Dahrendorf (1959), Ossowski (1963),
van den Berghe (1963), and Lenski (1966). As in the general case, these meta-theoretical
analyses posit a conceptual antinomy opposing Marxian/conflict and
Weberian/Durkheimian/functional paradigms. Isomorphic in intent, each exposition proceeds
to its conclusion by a similar path-unanimity in strategy which reflects shared
perceptions of the problem. The key position held in common by the four synthesists is
more implicit than explicit--it contends that the issue at hand is one of logic or
conceptual structure, a misalignment or misapplication of abstractions. To the extent that
this assumption is correct, synthesis is possible. If, however, the roots of impasse as
well as those of attempted resolution are social and historical, the outlook is less
promising. Which prognosis holds may be determined from the comparative successes and
failures of the synthetic attempts themselves.
Continuity and Discontinuity in the Search for Theoretical Unity. Variation in
tactics alongside unanimity in strategy is characteristic of the several attempts at
synthesis in stratification theory. This is evident at fundamental levels: the process by
which synthesis is to be achieved; the perceived nature of the theses to be fused; and the
identity of the nature of conflict in everyday life. If the formal definition of synthesis
is applied to the efforts at issue here, they adhere to it with different degrees of
faithfulness. That is, if synthesis is taken to be the unification of two structurally
isomorphic but substantively polarized conceptual products into an emergent and unique
whole, considerable but varying deviation from this criterion exists. In some instances,
synthesis is trivialized into a cautious eclecticism--the amalgamation of atomized parts
drawn from incommensurable wholes (cf. Ossowski, 1963). In others, it involves the
reduction of rich theory into bland and universal truisms which must be shared by any
perspective claiming to be sociological in approach (cf. van den Berghe, 1963).
In the remaining two treatments, those of Lenski (1966) and Dahrendorf (1959), synthesis
appears to be the discriminant application of two opposing traditions to different social
contexts. To show that all of these fall short of classical synthesis would be empty
formalism. Of greater significance to the sociology of knowledge are the common means by
which the several arguments proceed to their conclusions. The varying degrees to which
these works are not syntheses signifies less than does the degree to which they share
first principles. The overlapping ideas within this intellectual movement are indicative
of its origin and goals. By understanding then,, the prospect of valid synthesis may be
assessed more accurately.
Of the four arguments, the least developed are those of Ossowski (1963) and van den Berghe
(1963). Metaphorically, Ossowski (1963) conceives of the pivotal concept of
"class" as an elephant from whose formidable presence many wise but
blind(folded) thinkers have drawn a number of partial inferences from which spring in turn
incomplete and thus faulty conclusions concerning the whole. Thus, Ossowski contends,, by
bringing the multiple views into conceptual proximity, a picture of the whole emerges.
This is more the denial of conflict than it is its resolution. The presently consequential
aspect of this reading of the inequality literature is its emphasis on the
socio-historical development of contending theory. Other than this, its function is more
descriptive and summarizing than it is analytical. In terms of the current discussion, its
overtly amalgamating tendencies are its most salient feature.
Van den Berghe (1963), in contrast to Ossowski (1963), exhibits in concise form the
characteristic common to the more comprehensive treatments of Lenski (1966) and Dahrendorf
(1959). As Lenski notes in developing his own position, van den Berghe sees no essential
contradiction between the two dominant models of social inequality. Disregarding for the
moment the consequences of absent contradiction for formal synthesis, it still can be
stated that van den Berghe proposes that the two models arise out of two aspects or
principles existing within the same social reality. The two models are therefore merely
partial--they are not mutually exclusive. Each analytical tendency is addressing itself to
different social principles.
In light of the above, it is worth noting that van den Berghe (1963:701) recognizes that:
It is not enough to say that two theories are complementary and can be used ad hoc for different purposes; one must also show that they are reconcilable.
While it is true that van den Berghe speaks only of movement towards
a theoretical synthesis and does not propose the synthesis itself, problems still
remain. Indeed, a flaw which his argument shares with Ossowski's is that it is
questionable whether conflict, theoretical or otherwise, is effectively resolved by
locating commonalities as opposed to exploring the grounds of contention which are the
crux of the matter. Again, when disagreement is far reaching and fundamental, the
whittling of mighty theoretical timbers to the point of indistinguishability may end with
conceptual toothpicks: shared homilies of "holism?" the mutual coexistence of
conflict and consensus, evolutionism/progressivism and equilibristic modeling (van den
Berghe, 1963:701-704). With some reservations, this is movement scarcely beyond Parsons'
(1937) original attempt to find an underlying equivalence among a congery of 19th century
theorists. In effect, if we advance.the metaphor van den Berghe (1963:699) provides in
reference to "some sociologists" who threw out the Marxian baby with the Marxian
bathwater, van den Berghe's approach results in twice the bath water disposed and twice as
many defenestrated theories-cum-babies. Uniting the analyses of van den Berghe and
Ossowski is their conflict-denying nature. For them., conflict is a mistake or an error,
caused by ideological rigidity. It is an irrationality that inhibits theoretical growth.
In essence, both commentaries are peacemaking gestures. As they do not recognize the
"material" basis of conflict theory they cannot go beyond it. Lenski (1966)
attempts to do so by arguing that conceptual conflict is "real," i.e., it is
rooted in social relations.
Lenski (1966) accepts van den Berghe's position, but refines it considerably. He argues
that at different historical moments, two "ethics," the
"redistributive" and the "acquisitive," exist in varying proportions.
Furthermore, the contending forms of social reality are rooted in one or the other of
these principles. Consequently, the two theoretical models are of inversely proportional
utility in understanding the two social principles or ethics; they encompass one, but do
not comprehend the other. As a result of these first principles, it is possible for Lenski
to deduce that in one historical context, one model will be of greater explanatory value
than the other, depending on the "mix" of ethics. However, given that one
"principle" is never totally absent and also that the principles are
ideal-typical constructs taken from messy social reality, neither model is ever exhaustive
of social reality, nor can it be. Similarly, neither model is ever valueless. This latter
principle is the source of theoretical conflict--neither perspective can ever assert
itself totally, nor can it be vanquished totally. Opposition among traditions is thereby
seen to be a fixture of sociology by Lenski--that is, until its sources are made manifest
and subsequent adjustments made.
Based on the above, Lenski's (1966) position may be seen to be an improvement on, as well
as an extension of van den Berghe's argument. It sees theoretical conflict as substantive;
i.e., it is not an "irrationality" but rather represents an ideational
manifestation of conflict in society. It is not a "mistake," but an extension of
actual conflict in the social world. In this, it parallels Dahrendorf's (1959) arguments
in some detail. The nature of this congruency should be explored before the limitations
present in both are set forth.
It is the substance of Dahrendorf's (1959) position that Marx's focus on conflict among
groups enjoying differential benefits from variant social participation is fundamentally
correct. Dahrendorf then proceeds-to introduce a caveat: Marx's identification of economic
classes as the combatants is temporocentric. Marx's model thereby represents only a
specific manifestation of a more general social dialectic of inequality based on the
distribution of power in society. Instead of "class," "authority
group" is the key concept in Dahrendorf's (1959) analysis. This grafting of Weberian
notions of imperatively coordinated associations onto the Marxian dialectic is well within
the umbra of the Elitist conceptions of Mosca; it is clearly a "conflict" theory
and of an historically prevalent type.
Later on in the development of his argument, Dahrendorf (1959:159) notes the (then)
ascendance of "integration" models. Rather than burying them as, without
compunction, he does Marx, Dahrendorf honors these views. He sees them as honorable and of
equal value--from this he then goes on to assert that the conflict between coercive and
integrative models is irresolvable. The reasons for this assertion are interesting in
light of the three other works discussed previously (Dahrendorf, 1959:159):
There are sociological problems for the explanation of which the integration theory of society provides adequate assumptions; there are other problems which can be explained only in terms of the coercion theory of society, there are, finally, problems for which both theories appear adequate. For sociological analysis, society is Janus-headed, and its two faces are equivalent aspects of the same reality.
This is a close approximation of Lenski's position, except that
it is ahistorical. Whereas Lenski sees one or the other "ethic" as informing an
entire social epoch, Dahrendorf sees certain aspects of any and every society as more or
less appropriate to the development of a particular model. In this, Lenski shows greater
internal consistency than Dahrendorf in the earlier parts of his analysis, Dahrendorf
perceives the Marxian approach as more appropriate to 19th than to 20th century
capitalism. Be later asserts that the institutional mediation and regularization of
conflict in the twentieth century creates a situation compatible to integrative models.
The fact that Dahrendorf is less aware of the internal strictures of his argument than is
Lenski is telling: far more significant is his means for settling theoretical conflict.
The idea that conflict groups in society must exist in a context of overall coordination
is the crux of both Power and Privilege (Lenski, 1966) and Class and Class
Conflict in Industrial Society (Dahrendorf, 1959). Ultimately, both Dahrendorf and
Lenski build and rest their cases on this point, although with varying techniques and
degrees of success. Dahrendorf's global argument is that individual authority groups are
in conflict which is dysfunctional to both parties but, taken as social organizational
wholes consisting of paired opposites, they function for the good of society; i.e., in a
"necessary" or "eufunctional" manner. Consequently, the regulation of
conflict must be and is a prerequisite for social survival. Thus, the analysis of
labor-management relationships, if taken in isolation, may best be understood in terms of
conflict. If, however, the relationship of the two authority groups, super- and
subordinate, is taken as a totality--as the instrument of economic production--other
social institutions must be seen as regulating this conflict. The state, the church, the
press deal with and manage this conflict since to society as a whole production itself is
the salient issue. For survival purposes laws, informal and formal norms of legitimacy,
are deployed. These inter-institutional relations are therefore best analyzed in an
equilibristic manner. The development of "authority," as a concept and as an
empirical datum, comes to embody and contain conflict simultaneously.
Lenski's position differs from the above in few respects, but not definitively. The
material and technological bases of production are seen as significant in determining the
degree to which one or the other social organizational principle predominates. As was
previously noted, Lenski also sees significant historical and social variability in the
preeminence of a given ethic; for Dahrendorf this is only implied and is not confronted
directly. This conflict is theoretical, however; it is not metatheoretical. At the level
of reflexively comprehending previous theory, the three well developed attempts at
synthesis (including van den Berghe's) all pursue the same goal of establishing parallel
and partial antagonists which must be fused in the interest of sociological development.
The techniques by which this end is sought in turn form the basis from which two related
and critical matters arise: delineating the common nature of the synthetic attempts as
logical processes and accounting for their emergence and growth at a particular locus in
the history of social thought.
It may be worth noting that Young (1978) presents a quite different approach to the
relationship between conflict and functional analysis in everyday life. Young claims that
the primary relationship in capitalist/elitist societies is that of conflict: for each
party to the conflict, different social practices are, indeed, functional. Young instances
the two parties affected by the separation of productive processes from distributive
processes. Capitalists, following a profit motive, hold goods off the market until they
can be exchanged at a rate sufficient to satisfy the acquisitive ethic. Those who are
thereby excluded from capitalist modes of distribution constitute a surplus population.
For the surplus population with its peculiar frame of reference, crime is functional. For
the capitalist, crime is dysfunctional. Living in two conflicting positions in the
marketplace, each party to the conflict sees and experiences a given practice of the other
differently. This model, Young argues, favors the conflict paradigm but adds that while a
functional analysis is appropriate, the function of the practice in question is not at all
one and only one thing. Nor is the assumption of structural-functional theory that a given
practice is functional (or dysfunctional)for the whole society valid.
A second example of a conflicting function is advertising. From the point of interest of
capitalists, advertising is a structure which functions to reunite production and
consumption. In terms of the interests of workers and those in the surplus population,
advertising is dysfunctional. Young's position is compatible with the critique made in
this paper. His perspective treats functionalism as a minor, even trivial amendment to
conflict analysis.
The Form and Function of Theoretical Crisis Management. In order to encompass the
conceptually cohesive movement towards synthesis in stratification theory,it is first
necessary to recognize its temporally limited and societally diverse origins. From the
appearance of Dahrendorf's (1959) work, through that of van den Berghe (1963) and Ossowski
(1963), to Lenski's (1966) Power and Privilege is only seven years. The
different national origins of the authors are particularly provocative in the face of this
very peculiar coincidence. To account for this merely by cultural/intellectual diffusion
is, as always, to beg the question of why a particular idea strikes a responsive chord in
different people in a variety of contexts. Furthermore, neither Ossowski nor van den
Berghe cite Dahrendorf or each other: it is only Lenski who cumulated previous work,
citing all three of the others in his considerable bibliography. On the basis of this
bibliographic evidence, as well as the previous caveat about the meaning of diffusion, it
would seem permissible to build a prima facie case for a sociological explanation
of this briefly flaring and then evanescing movement. Similarly, at the broader
metatheoretical level, Gouldner's (1971) and Friedrichs' (1970) analyses appear almost
simultaneously and, as in the more focused works, neither one cites the other, nor do they
attend to the four discussions of interest here with the exception of a general and
passing reference to Dahrendorf in Gouldner (1971:378).
Gouldner's (1971) famous post mortem on "Western" sociology provides a
general answer to the question of conceptual roots posed above. In essence, it is that
functionalism--particularly its Parsonian variant--was dead or dying by the late 1950's.
For those concerned with inequality, social "structure," and power, the emerging
micro-social paradigms--dramaturgical and/or ethmomethodological--were of scant solace. At
the same time, Marxism had been de-legitimized; either it had been consigned to the
dustbin of history as "prescientific" (cf. Martindale, 1960:160-161) or, in
works without number, it had been relegated to the domain of the "merely
ideological." This was decidedly uncomfortable for European or European oriented
social theorists, including the several mentioned here, since the sociological dialogue
with the ghost of Marx was less mystified in Europe than it was in North America.
Dahrendorf's "Partial" and intricate "refutation" of Marx's unwritten
section of Capital is more than just an act of intellectual audacity, it is
testimony to the continued presence of the spectre haunting sociology. Ossowski's
inorganic presentation of Marx's concept of class, in light of the absence of Lukacs,
Gramsci, and Korsch from his analyses, also speaks to the incomplete exorcism of the grim
apparition.
The movement for synthesis in stratification theory exists in an even broader context of
intellectual crisis and response. The ideational "exhaustion" of which D. Bell
(1960) speaks also realizes itself in the once-torrid debate over the "End of
Ideology." This extensive exchange is co-temporal with the movement of current
interest. In anticipation of a later point, it might also be noted that this
"debate" takes place in the context of an academic sociology from which many
marxists, if not Marxism itself, had been removed in the early 1950's. The movement in
social theory stretches from the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's; it ends not as a result of
its own internal dialectic, but instead terminates as a result of the massive resurgence
of Marxist theory flowing from the exposure of the contradictions implicit in the internal
and external academic sociology. Academic sociology resuscitates a flagging functionalism
and simultaneously extends the olive branch of "detente" and peaceful
coexistence to Marxian theory. Given all of this, it appears difficult to fault the
movement to synthesis by any, that is, except the hard-core ideologue. Since the latter is
by definition beyond the pale of social science, the objections emanating therefrom are of
little interest. It is a reasonable solution to an intransigent problem. The problem,
however, is that this cure for the ills of contemporary sociology is based on false
premises. It is itself afflicted from the outset. Primary among these genetic defects is a
misrepresentation of Marxism, as well as a related and similarly flawed estimation of the
metatheoretical equivalence of Marxism and functionalism. The severity of this is such
that it casts doubt on the very question of synthesis itself, and not merely these
particular incarnations.
A singular paradox exists in the broad movement toward synthesis examined above. It is a
logical inversion whereby the flaws of functionalism become transformed into the flaws of
Marxism. This is most evident in van den Berghe, where the proposed synthesis begins with
the posited equivalence of two perspectives and ends with a set of principles, not only of
a vitiating generality, but also largely deduced from a single perspective--functionalism.
Rather than an emergent whole, or even an even-handed amalgamation, conflict theory is
treated as a minor amendment to functionalism. In this correction" the two
perspectives are superimposed and their intersection is noted. While of intrinsic
metatheoretical value, this is not synthesis, neither formalistically nor substantively.
Indeed, the result of this process of reduction to shared first principles is devastating
to the other arguments sharing the goal of theoretical synthesis--it undercuts the
"movement's" very reason for being. At the same time it makes evident the way by
which marxism becomes the scapegoat for functionalism's afflictions.
The metatheoretical basis for these synthetic attempts is the perception that the
competing models are simultaneously incomplete and complementary. Yet, van den Berghe
demonstrates by one of several possible paths that at their root, functionalism and
"conflict" theory share important assumptions. This particular approach emanates
from an atmosphere of crisis in functionalism; it could as easily and more profitably be
induced from a sympathetic reading of Marxism. The central concept of emerging
contradiction, the positive valuation of capitalist epochs in their early stages, and the
idea of the cruel necessity of the capitalist accumulation of surplus value as a
precondition for the advent of communism all point to the acknowledgment of integrative
forces in society. In a like manner, Marx's and marxist analyses of the state and religion
are negative, but clear manifestations of an awareness of and interest in institutional
arrangements which serve to mediate conflict. Where then is the problem? What is lacking?
What calls forth synthesis with such urgency? Again, at a primary level it is the crisis
of functionalism; its inability to deal with the empirical reality of conflict in the
modern world. This shortcoming exists not only as a substantive failing; i.e., the
inability to explain, but also as a formal theoretical failing. By this it is meant that
there is no functionalist theory of social inequality; it is not just a matter of
inadequacy, it is a matter of total absence. It is this latter point that accounts for the
failings of the analyses surveyed here and which also leads to the conclusion that
"synthesis" itself is chimerical--a result of crisis management in sociological
theory in capitalist societies and not of the actualities of social life.
The penultimate substantive issue latent within the metatheory of sociological synthesis
is simple to state; "functionalism" is not a theory, it is a perspective on
social reality; Marxism is both. The multiple and recurrent consequences of this
conceptual distinction appear throughout the four analyses at hand, albeit in variable
form. In terms of general issues, Mills (1959) noted this long ago in his scathing
criticism of "Grand Theory." Merton's (1949) call for theory of the "middle
range" is also a by-product of a critical reading of Parsonian functionalism. To
acknowledge this is not to beat a dead horse; that which is true at the general
theoretical level is more poignantly true in the more specific instance of social
stratification. Other than in the brief flurry of activity surrounding the appearance of
Davis and Moore's (1945) "Some Principles of Stratification,"
"functionalism" does not address the issue of social inequality. To place this
limited output on the scales with that emanating from Marx and his intellectual heirs
results in a disproportion of no small degree.
With the exception of Dahrendorf, who has a special elitist argument with Marx's ghost,
the synthetic attempts examined here deal with this imbalance in a common and preconscious
manner. In effect, they structurally-functionalize Marx. This is not pat, if clumsy,
phrase-mongering. It precisely describes the genesis of a metaphysical entity labeled
"conflict" theory. While not confined to this particular intellectual
endeavor--in fact, it is of no mean ubiquity--it is of vital importance to an
understanding of the sources of the deficiency in efforts to synthesize theory.
Functionalism, in its parsonian guise, parallels at a broad theoretical level that which
van den Berghe attempts in his reading of the stratification literature. It represents the
truncation by superimposition of the major non- and anti-Marxist theorists. It distills
from a vast and rich body of often contradictory concepts and propositions a shared
outlook. At-this level, structural functionalism represents a massive and valuable
metatheoretical effort. As has so often been noted, its attempt to deduce formal
propositions from this twice-abstracted body of ideas that generates difficulty. In Marx,
"grounded" theory is the rule, and a self-conscious one. Ignoring for the moment
the methodological implications of dialecticism, Marxism still represents a structure of
testable hypotheses. Dahrendorf builds his entire argument around this fact, attempting to
refute the more central ones by reference to empirical social reality. In order to compare
structural functionalism to marxism, Marx must be transformed. Structural functionalism
cannot be or has not been reconstructed into the practical and ad hoc science of
Marx; therefore, it is marxism that must be altered. This is done by placing Marx in the
context of a number of other thinkers, not a few of whom--to wit, Mosca and Weber--write
in rebuttal to him. The common perspective shared by these thinkers is then converted into
a putative and highly conditional structure known as "conflict theory." A part
of the synthetic difficulty noted above flows from this forced reconstruction of Marxism
which posits a false logical-structural isomorphism between it and structural
functionalism.
The logical-structural problem developed here is as follows: synthetic attempts in
stratification theory have failed for two related reasons. At one level, the formal
structure of synthesis has been violated: the opposing positions are fundamentally
incommensurate. Structural functionalism is a perspective, Marxism a theory, conditional
or otherwise. Merely to attempt a synthesis requires a reduction of Marxism to general
principles. one that emerges from Marx's logical base in Hegel is the position of social
conflict as the ghost within the machine of history. This position is shared with other
social thinkers, as well as representing a logical-structural parallel to a central aspect
of structural functionalism: the principle of social "integration." At the same
time this generalizing process succeeds in eliminating logical-structural impasse, it
negates it. That is, no longer are the original combatants present: one has become a
shadow of itself.
This problem is particularly evident in van den Berghe (1963) as his argument proceeds at
the highest level of abstraction. It is less noticeable in Dahrendorf and Ossowski, as
they deal with Marx per se. In these two attempts at synthesis,
"functional" or integrative aspects of society are given shortest shrift; they
are subsumed within an overall context of conflict, with Dahrendorf's argument proceeding
at a level of great subtlety. It is not coincidental that these authors are the least
assertive of the four regarding their synthetic aims, as opposed to accumulative or
modifying ends. Lenski proceeds in the same manner as van den Berghe, resulting in the
extraction of highly generalized social "ethics," or normative principles of
social organization. Unlike van den Berghe, Lenski then proceeds to ground these
principles in society;in history. In so doing, however, the inescapable problem of these
syntheses reappears--they are not syntheses. When Lenski does provide his interesting
empirical excursus,the ethics are in phase: they either alternate or appear in complement;
they do not merge.
Regardless of the empirical and/or metatheoretical insights to be gleaned en passant from
the four works, their stated goal is not achieved. They do not synthesize; rather, they
crisis-manage. The sociological and social context which brings forth this tendency was
outlined previously. The structural-logical features which fatally flaw the attempts were
also elucidated. At an earlier point, however, it was suggested that there were problems
of synthesis in stratification theory as such which exceed the problematic aspects of
particular attempts, individually or as a metatheoretical tendency. Furthermore, it was
contended that the difficulty of synthesis in stratification theory was not at its base
logical-structural, although the nullity may and does manifest itself in this manner.
Given previous assertions, then, it still remains to be demonstrated that the sources of
this theoretical blockage result from the social nature of social theory. In brief, the
argument proceeds as follows.
The Social Negation of Theoretical Synthesis. It is a much belabored truism
that social theory is itself a socio-cultural artifact. It is equally axiomatic that the
experience of and perspective on society held by a given theorist or school is always
particular to one or another social sector, regardless of protestations of universality or
"value-freedom." This operates in two ways: both at the level of the theorists'
sectoral affiliation as well as the aspects of social reality addressed. These are not
unrelated metatheoretical phenomena, although of the four synthesists discussed here, only
Dahrendorf's analysis demonstrates a sensitivity to, if not an awareness of this important
issue. While great significance is attached in each synthetic essay to the mutual
incompleteness of Marxist/ conflict and functional perspectives, the source of partial
adequacy is generally portrayed as merely "ideological"; i.e., as prescientific.
This dismissal, overt or subtle, is itself based on an ideological position--the
free-floating nature of social thought.
To deny the "class basis" of the two sociological positions at issue. is to deny
the core of their being as social products. Further, it brings forth a situation in which
any school must be denatured when viewed as commensurate with its intellectual
adversaries. As the roots of a social theory grow from its social base, the aspects of
social reality which it portrays as well as the evaluations made of that reality tend to
reflect the interests of the class of origin and/or orientation of the theorists producing
it. Oversimplifying somewhat, the exploited or their intellectual supporters will address
themselves to the problems and nature of exploitation. Conversely, those speaking for the
advantaged classes will emphasize the maintenance of the existing order, and the social
mechanisms thereof; e.g., "authority," the state, religion, law and the sources
of order. These are not novel observations, yet the significance of them for the
possibility of synthesis remains unappreciated.
The removal of the "ideological" or class-based aspects of a social theory is
equivalent to the vitiation of the positions. It removes the force of their arguments at
the same time it eliminates their raison d'etre. After having been pruned of their
social-theoretical roots, they become conceptually vapid--they lose the power of
conviction which grows out of social conflict itself. Van den Berghe's analysis represents
a clear and ideal-typical instance of the results of this program of theoretical
pacification. When Lenski and Dahrendorf apply the techniques of theoretical
crisis-management, they do not produce a synthesis--that is, something novel--but rather
generate amendments to, emendations of and qualifications of the general position
elucidated by Parsons. This is a result of the state of modern sociology at a particular
period in its development and not a product of the substance of extant social theory
itself. To the extent that social theory is itself a product of social conditions and an
adjunct to or substitute for overt social conflict, synthesis cannot be an expected
outcome. To the extent that sociology represents the interests and perspectives of social
sectors with a vested and material interest in the persistence of existing social
arrangements, it will continue to accept this management of theoretical conflict. As such,
the search for synthesis itself represents an attempt to halt at the level of ideas what
it has attempted but been unable to halt in everyday life: social conflict. This is not an
option closed to sociology by its own failings, but is a possibility obviated by the
nature of contemporary society itself.
REFERENCES
Bell, Daniel 1960 The End of Ideology. New York: The Free Press.
Dahrendorf, Ralf 1959 Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Davis, Kingsley and Wilbert Moore 1945 "Some principles of stratification."
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Friedrichs, Robert L. 1970 A Sociology of Sociology. New York: The Free Press.
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1971 The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. New York; Equinox Books.
Lenski, Gerhard 1966 Power and Privilege. New York: McGraw Hill.
Martindale, Don 1960 The nature and Types of Sociological Theory. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The Riverside Press.
Merton,l Robert K. 1949 "On sociological theories of the middle range." American
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Mills, C. Wright 1959 The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Parsons, Talcott 1937 The Structure of Social Action. New York: McGraw Hill.
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Young, T. R. 1978 Personal communication.